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Notes
The California Hospital Lien Act and "Balance
Billing": Protecting Innocent Patients' Right to
Limit a Medical Care Provider's Recovery By
Statutory Lien
DARIEN J. COVELENS*

THE PARNELL SCENARIO'

After a long day of work, Joel Parnell decides to hire a taxicab to
drive him home. While Parnell rides as a passenger in the taxi, the driver
cautiously proceeds through a four-way stop intersection. Unbeknownst
to the taxi driver or Parnell, another man (the "Tortfeasor") is also
driving home from work and approaches the same intersection from
another direction. The Tortfeasor is speeding excessively and negligently
fails to stop or even slow down at the same four-way intersection. The
Tortfeasor's pickup truck slams into the side of Parnell's taxi as his driver
passes through the middle of the intersection and seriously injures
Parnell. Parnell is rushed to nearby San Joaquin Community Hospital
where he is treated for his injuries. Parnell eventually makes a full
recovery.
San Joaquin Community Hospital has a specific contractual
agreement with Parnell's medical insurance carrier,' Wholesale Beer
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005; B.S. Eastern
Mennonite University, 20O5. I would especially like to thank Marcia Augsburger for her valuable
comments, suggestions, and insight over the past year, without which this writing would have been not
have been possible.
i. The brief facts described in Parnellv. Adventist Health System/West, 13x Cal. Rptr. 2d 148, 151
(Cal. Ct. App. 2oo3), cert. granted,69 P.3d 978 (2003), a case currently before the California Supreme
Court, have been augmented here to assist the reader's understanding of the complex results when
applying the California Hospital Lien Act. Hypothetical figures have been added to illustrate the
differing amounts recoverable by a patient.
2. Most hospital systems and medical service providers have agreed-upon contractual rates with
regional and national health insurance carriers. See, e.g., Swanson v. St. John's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 118
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Distributor Industry Trust Health Plan. Under this agreement, any
health care services provided to members of Parnell's insurance carrier
are paid by the insurance carrier: at discounted rates. A person paying
cash for exactly the same medical services would pay a much larger
amount ("customary rates").
For purposes of this Note, assume that San Joaquin Community
Hospital charges Parnell's insurance carrier $ioo,ooo for Parnell's
injuries, while the customary rates listed in San Joaquin's price schedule
for the same services is $230,000. The insurance carrier pays San Joaquin

the negotiated discount rates for Parnell's health care and closes the
insurance report. Both Parnell and his insurance carrier assume the
payment of health care costs is complete.
Meanwhile, Parnell files a separate negligence suit against the
Tortfeasor for his injuries. Again, for purposes of this Note's analysis,
assume that Parnell recovers a. $250,000 judgment in California state
court. Several days after the judgment is finalized, Parnell receives a
notice of lien from San Joaquin Community Hospital? The notice of lien
informs him that the hospital has asserted a statutory lien against
Parnell's recovery under the California Hospital Lien Act for San
Joaquin's "usual and customary charges." The notice of lien declares that
San Joaquin is entitled to an additional $130,000 from Parnell's judgment
to recover the difference between the discounted rates paid by Parnell's
health insurance carrier ($ioo,ooo) and San Joaquin's customary rates
listed under its price schedule ($230,000). Parnell challenges the lien in

California Superior Court. He contends that the insurance carrier's
payment to San Joaquin at the discounted rates alleviates him from any
obligation to pay the hospital from his judgment, citing authority from
the First District of the California Court of Appeal. San Joaquin
Community Hospital's counsel counters with authority from the Second
District allowing recovery of the difference between San Joaquin's
discounted and customary rates.
INTRODUCTION

While the figures
purposes, the scenario
Health System/West, a
Court. The California
whether the California
providers to recover

described above are assumed for explanatory
matches that presented, in Parnell v. Adventist
case currently before the California Supreme
Courts of Appeal are split over the issue of
Hospital Lien Act ("HLA") allows medical care
from patients the difference between their

Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Whiteside v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d
58o, 582-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Discounted and customary charges are discussed in more detail
below.
3. Assume the lien notice complies with CAL. CIV. CODE § 3045.3 (West 1993 ).
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customary rates and the negotiated discount rates paid by health
insurance carriers. This practice is known as "balance billing."4 The
California Supreme Court has, until now, declined to resolve the
"purported conflict" between the Courts of Appeal
This Note analyzes the practice of so-called balance billing by
statutory lien in California. Balance billing occurs when a medical care
provider accepts a discounted payment from an insurance carrier as
payment in full and then attempts to recover the balance of its customary
rates from the patient.6 Generally, balance billing is prohibited by
California law At least one court has held that a medical care provider
attempting to recover costs based on its customary rates by HLA lien
after receiving payment pursuant to discounted rates constitutes balance
billing.8
In particular, this Note addresses the split in the California Courts of
Appeal and analyzes the legal and practical effects of applying each of
the two leading authorities. Such a recovery presents a two-faceted
dilemma. On the one hand, there is a strong argument that because the
medical care provider has specifically contracted for discounted rates
with a health insurance carrier, its lien recovery should be limited to that
amount.9 In addition, medical care providers are often more able to bear
the costs of medical care than patients under the economic cost/benefit
model. On the other hand, a strong policy argument supports recovery
for the medical care provider. If medical care providers (such as
hospitals, clinics, medical groups, etc.) are not allowed to recover some
of the difference between their customary and discounted rates, then
there is less of an incentive for these providers to offer beneficial or
essential medical services to other patients.
The first Section of this Note describes hospital billing practices,
gives a brief overview of statutory liens, and examines the history of the
California Hospital Lien Act. The second Section considers the two
major cases where California courts have confronted the issue of balance
4. Compare Nishihama v. City & County of San Francisco, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 86I, 867-68 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2ooi) (holding that "balance billing" is prohibited by California law) with Swanson, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 330 (allowing "balance billing").
5. Olszewski v. Scripps Health, 69 P.3 d 927, 944 n.I9 (Cal. 2003) (stating that Mercy Hosp. &
Med. Ctr. v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 932 P.2d 2io (Cal. 1997) was inapplicable and there was no
need to resolve any "purported conflict" between Nishihama and Swanson).
6. Whiteside, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584.
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1379 (West 2000). Section 1379 provides in pertinent part,

"[e]very contract between a [health] plan and a provider of health care services shall.., set forth that
in the event the plan fails to pay for health care services ... the subscriber or enrollee shall not be liable
to the providerfor any sums owed by the plan." Id. § 1379(a) (emphasis added).
8. See Nishihama, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867-68 (holding that medical care providers asserting a
lien on judgments levied against third parties may only recover up to the discounted rates under the
HLA).
9. See, e.g., id. at 866-67.
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billing. This Note then applies the reasoning of both the Nishihama v.
City and County of San Francisco" and Swanson v. St. John's Regional
Medical Center" cases to the facts of the Parnell Scenario and analyze the
results. Each case's application to the Parnell Scenario described above
drastically changes the patient's and medical care provider's net recovery
under the HLA.
The third Section of this Note argues that California courts should
follow the Nishihama court's interpretation of the HLA because it is a
more reasonable and equitable solution to the issue of balance billing.
The third Section also suggests that California courts should not follow
the Swanson court's interpretation of the HLA because that court
misinterpreted California law and reached a less equitable solution than
the Nishihama decision.
The fourth Section of the Note concludes that the Parnell v.
Adventist Health System/West case currently before the California
Supreme Court should end the appellate court dispute over the balance
billing issue. The California Supreme Court should follow the Nishihama
court's reasoning and disallow balance billing in California.
I.

A.

HOSPITAL LIENS IN CALIFORNIA

HOSPITAL CHARGES

Insurance companies have employed a number of different financial
vehicles in an attempt to slow the exponential growth of medical care
costs. 2 These vehicles attempt to limit the costs of medical insurance to
members while allowing the insurance companies to remain profitable. 3
The result is a marked difference between the actual costs that medical
care providers list on their internal price schedules ("usual and
customary rates") and the amount actually paid for such services
("discounted rates") by health insurance carriers."
A useful analogy for understanding the two types of medical care
rates is that of motel rates charged to visiting guests.'5 A hospital's "usual
and customary" rates are analogous to the rates listed by motels on their

to. Id. at 861.
ii. Swanson v. St. John's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
12. Such vehicles include "preferred provider agreements" and capitation-based health
maintenance organizations ("HMOs"). Parnell v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148, 151
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted, 69 P.3d 978 (Cal. 2003). A description of these financial vehicles is
beyond the scope of this Note.
13. See id.
14. Telephone Interview with Marcia Augsburger, Shareholder, McDonough, Holland & Allen
P.C. (Dec. 17, 2003); see also Parnell,131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151-52.
15. Telephone Interview with Stephen C. Ruehmann, Shareholder, McDonough, Holland &
Allen P.C., (Dec. 19, 2003).
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internal price schedules-high rates that very few persons actually pay. 6
Typically, only unprepared travelers pay the hotel's full listed rates.
Similarly, very few patients actually pay a hospital's usual and customary
rates.'7 In fact, the only way a patient is likely to pay a hospital's
customary rates is if the patient is uninsured and pays cash.' The
discounted rates typically paid by health insurance carriers are similar to
the various discounts available to experienced and travel-savvy motel
guests.'9
Contracted rates between medical care providers and health
insurance carriers are often complex and multi-tiered documents." These
contracts typically require health insurance carriers to encourage their
members to use "preferred provider" medical care providers instead of
the member's hospital of choice." In addition, such contracts normally
require the health insurance carrier to reimburse the hospitals according
to the negotiated discount rates and require22 the hospital to consider the
insurer's reimbursement as payment in full.
B.

LIENS

Under California law, a lien is a "charge imposed in some mode
other than by a transfer in trust upon specific property by which it is
made security for the performance of an act."23 Thus, a lien typically does
not create a right in the property itself, but rather a right to levy on the
property and sell it for satisfaction of the debt. 4
A lien may be created by contract or by operation of law. 5 At
common law, the validity of a lien depended on an actual and continued
possession of the property. 6 Common law courts have allowed liens in
favor of innkeepers, common carriers, mechanics, and other manual
laborers receiving property for the purpose of repairing or improving
that property.2 7 Statutory liens, by contrast, expressly create a property
right in favor of a creditor regardless of whether such a lien existed at
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
59. Id. Such discounts include AAA, AARP, etc.
20. Interview with Marcia Augsburger, supra note 14;see, e.g., Parnell v. Adventist Health
Sys.AW., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148, 158-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2oo3), cert. granted,69 P.3d 978 (2oo3).
21. Id. at 158-59. One such method of encouragement is allow lower deductibles and other costs
for members using "preferred provider" hospitals. Id. at 158 n.4.
22. See, e.g., id. at 158-59.
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2872 (West 1993); 4 B.E. WrTKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW, PERS. PROP. § 168
(9th ed. 1987).
24. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 933 (7th ed. 1999). See generally 51 AM. JUR. 2D Liens § 1

(2ooo).

25. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 933-35 (7th ed. 1999).
26. Meta Calder, Florida'sHospital Lien Laws, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 341,343 (1993)27. Id.
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common law or if a contract existed between the parties. " All hospital
liens are necessarily statutory liens because no such right existed at
common law. 9
C.

THE CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL LIEN ACT

During the Great Depression Era of the 193Os, state legislatures
throughout the country began to enact hospital lien statutes to mitigate
the losses incurred when hospitals treated insolvent patients." By 1939,
approximately twenty-five states had hospital lien statutes.3 ' While the
details of these statutes are beyond the scope of this Note, the mere fact
that such a large number of states enacted them within a relatively short
period of time indicates a serious legislative concern for protecting
hospitals and other medical care providers from insolvent patients.
The California legislature enacted the original HLA in 1961,
codified at California Civil Code sections 3045.1 through 3045.6. The
original HLA established a hospital's right to a statutory lien 33 for the
reasonable value of emergency services to parties. 4 The purpose of the
original HLA 35 was "to secure part of the patient's recovery from liable
third persons to pay his or her hospital bill, while ensuring that the
patient retained sufficient funds to address other losses resulting from
tortious injury." 6 The California legislature intended for financially able
persons to pay their medical bills, while providing protection for needy
28. A statutory lien is a "lien arising solely by force of statute, not by agreement of the parties."
935 (7th ed. 1999).
29. J.F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Construction, Operation, and Effect of Statute Giving Hospital
Lien Against Recovery from Tortfeasor Causing Patient's Injuries, 25 A.L.R. 3d 858, 862 (1969).
30. Calder, supra note 26, at 351-52.
31. Id. at 352.
32. Swanson v. St. John's Reg'l Med. Ctr., i18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 328-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
33. See CAL. CIV.CODE §3045.1 (West 1993).
34. CAL. CIV. CODE §3045.1 (Deering 1961) (amended 1992).
35. Former section 3045.1 provided that a hospital which
furnishes emergency medical or other services of a reasonable value in excess of one
hundred dollars ($ioo) to any person injured by reason of an accident or wrongful act not
covered by [workers' compensation] ... shall, if the person asserts or maintains a claim
against another for damages on account of his injuries, have alien upon the damages in
excess of one hundred dollars ($ioo)recovered, or to be recovered, by the person ... to the
extent of the amount of the reasonable and necessary charges of the hospital for the
treatment, care, and maintenance of the person in the hospital during the emergency
period.
Id.
36. Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 932 P.2d 210, 212 (Cal. 1997). A
committee report prepared in conjunction with the 1992 amendments provides that
hospitals, including those that operate trauma centers, treat accident victims, many of whom
are uninsured. Many hospitals have problems keeping their emergency rooms open because
a large proportion of accident victims are uninsured. The purpose of this bill is to make it
possible for hospitals to seek payment, particularly from insurance companies whose clients
have accidentally or negligently hurt another person ....
Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assemb. B. No. 2733, 1991-1992 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal.
1992) (as amended May 6, 1992).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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patients from medical bills "so burdensome as to pauperize [him] or his
family."37
In 1992, the California legislature amended the HLA to its current
form. 8 The current version of the HLA gives medical care providers the
right to place a statutory lien on a patient's judgment "to the extent of
the amount of the reasonable and necessary charges of the hospital."39 A
HLA lien applies "whether the damages are recovered, or are to be
recovered, by judgment, settlement, or compromise."4' The 1992
amendment also sets forth the notice requirements that a medical care
provider must meet- to properly hold a HLA lien.4' Finally, the 1992
version of the HLA provides the method for paying the lien by a thirdparty tortfeasor to the medical care provider and limits the amount a
hospital may recover by HLA lien. 2
II.

INTERPRETATION OF THE HOSPITAL LIEN ACT BY CALIFORNIA COURTS

The California Supreme Court stated in 1997 that the HLA has been
the subject of "scant interpretation" by courts since its enactment.43 Since
the HLA's amendment in 1992, a relatively small number of published
cases have addressed the HLA and liens levied against a patient's

37. Mercy Hosp., 932 P.2d at 212 (quoting Margaret Greenfield, Property Liens for County
Hospital Care-A Collection Tool, 8 LEGIS. PROBS. '3 (t961)). Apparently the California Hospital
Association's membership survey revealed that the average hospital lost at least $9o,ooo as a result of
injured persons collecting a judgment or settlement and failing to discharge any portion of the hospital
bill. Id. at 215.
38. The amendment of sections 3045.1, 3045.3, and 3045.4 expanded "the lien's scope to include

'emergency and ongoing medical or other services' and deleted the $1oo floor." Id. at 218 n.3.
39. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3045.1 (West 1993). Section 3045.1 states in pertinent part:
Every ... institution or body maintaining a hospital licensed under the laws of this state
which furnishes emergency and ongoing medical or other services to any person injured by
reason of an accident or negligent or other wrongful act... shall, if the person has a claim
against another for damages on account of his or her injuries, have a lien upon the damages
recovered ... by the person ... to the extent of the amount of the reasonable and necessary
charges of the hospital.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3045.1. The lien applies to any damages "recovered, or... to be recovered, by
judgment, settlement, or compromise." Id. § 3045.2.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 3045.3. The notice requirement of section 3045.3 goes beyond the scope of this Note.
42. Section 3045.4 provides in pertinent part that
[alny person, firm, or corporation, including.., insurance carrier[s], making any payment to
the injured person ... for the injuries he or she sustained.., without paying [the medical
care provider] ... the amount of its lien claimed in the notice, or so much thereof as can be
satisfied out of 50 percent of the moneys due under any final judgment.., shall be liable to
the [medical care provider] ... for the amount of its lien claimed in the notice which the
hospital was entitled to receive as payment for the medical care and services rendered to
the injured person.
Id. § 3045.4. The "hospital may, at any time within one year after the date of the payment to the
injured person ...enforce its lien by filing an action at law against the person.., making the
payment and to whom" the notice was given. Id. § 3045.5.
43. Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 932 P.2d 210, 213 (Cal. 1997).
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recovery.' At issue in Mercy Hospital and Medical Center v. Farmers
Insurance Group of Companies was the applicability of California Civil
Code section 3045.4 (limiting the amount of HLA lien liability)4' on a
tortfeasor's insurance company who failed to pay to a hospital at the time
of judgment. 6 However, the California Supreme Court did not consider
the issue of balance billing in Mercy Hospital or any subsequent case.
Instead, the California Courts of Appeal have adopted two opposing
theories regarding the validity of balance billing.
A.

NISHIHAMA V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

In Nishihama v. City and County of San Francisco, the California
Court of Appeal for the First District was squarely confronted with the
issue of whether a hospital could use the HLA to recover a portion or all
of the difference between its discount and customary rates from a
patient.47 The Nishihama court held that a medical care provider
asserting a HLA lien may only recover up to the contractual rates agreed
upon with the health insurance carrier for the type of service rendered to
the insured patient. 8 Since the hospital in Nishihama had been paid its
full discounted rates by the health insurance carrier, it had no HLA lien
rights to any damages awarded to the patient regardless of the amount of
its customary rates.49 The court dismissed the hospital's contention that
the phrase "reasonable and necessary charges" in section 3045.1 (giving
the medical care provider the right to place a HLA lien on a patient's
judgment) could mean the hospital's customary rates.50 Instead, the court
said, the phrase "reasonable and necessary" is tied to the amount
actually charged to the injured patient's insurance company, or the
hospital's discounted rates.5
In Nishihama, the court reasoned that any lien rights of the medical
care provider are necessarily defined by any contracts between it and a
patient's health insurance carrier. 2 The court interpreted section 3045.4
to limit a HLA lien to any discounted rates agreed upon between the
medical care provider and a health insurance carrier. 3 Thus, the court
44. See, e.g., Swanson v. St. John's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002);
Nishihama v. City & County of San Francisco, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Parnell v.
Adventist Health Sys./W., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted, 69 P.3d 978 (Cal.
2003).
45. See supra note 42.
46. Mercy Hosp., 932 P.2d at 211.
47. Nishihama v. City & County of San Francisco, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 866-67 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
5i. Id.
52. Id.
53. "The amount that a hospital is entitled to receive as payment necessarily turns on any
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held that balance billing for a portion of the difference between a
hospital's discount and customary rates is prohibited by California law
and a medical care provider may not recover more than its discounted
rates by HLA lien. 4
B.

SWANSON V. ST. JOHN'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

The California Court of Appeal for the Second District revisited the
same issue presented in the Nishihama case a year later in Swanson v. St.
John's Regional Medical Center.5 The Swanson court, however, reached
an opposite conclusion. There, the court held that the payment of
discounted charges by the patient's health insurance carrier does not
extinguish the hospital's statutory lien? 6 The court relied on a textual
interpretation of the HLA, stating that in statutory construction "'the
office of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or
in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to
omit what has been inserted."' 57 The Swanson court concluded that
because medical care providers may assert HLA liens "'to the extent of
the amount of the reasonable and necessary charges of the hospital...
for the treatment, care, and maintenance' of a patient injured by a
tortfeasor," the HLA authorizes balance billing."
The Swanson court's holding relied on two central premises, citing
the Mercy Hospital decision as support for each. 9 First, the Swanson
court held that a HLA lien "is a statutory lien and does not require that
the patient owe the hospital a debt '60 The court implicitly rejected the
requirement that a lien merely secures the "payment of an underlying
debt or obligation.
Second, the court reasoned that the hospital lien
under the HLA "is not a charge against the patient. To the contrary, it is
a 'statutory medical lien in favor of a hospital against third persons liable
for the patient's injuries. ' ' ' 61 Citing these propositions, the Swanson court
concluded that it was bound by the Mercy Hospital decision to allow
balance billing.63 The court also examined the legislative intent,
explaining that "because the [California state] legislature has determined
agreement it has with the injured person or the injured person's health insurance carrier." Id.
54. Id. at 867-68.
55. 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).

56. Id. at 329-30.
57. Id. at 327 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1858 (West 1993); Lazar v. Hertz Corp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d
368,374 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).
58. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3045.1 (West 1993)).
59. Parnell v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert.
granted, 69 P.3d 978 (2003).

6o. Swanson, ir8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 328 (citing Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Farmers Ins. Group of
Cos., 932 P.2d 210, 211 (Cal. 1997)).
6i. Parnell,I31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154 (discussing the Swanson decision).
62. Swanson, t18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329 (quoting from Mercy Hospital., 932 P.2d at 211).
63. Id. at 330.
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that hospital liens are exempt from balance billing limits, we may not
override that determination." 64 Not surprisingly, hospitals and other
medical care providers have relied on the Swanson case to justify their
practice of balance billing under the HLA. 65 The unreasonableness of
relying on the Swanson court's logic will be discussed in Section III.
D.

APPLICATION OF THE NISHIHAMA AND SWANSON DECISIONS TO THE
PARNELL SCENARIO

In Mercy Hospital and Medical Center v. Farmers Insurance Group
of Companies, the California Supreme Court considered whether the
tortfeasor's insurance company, who distributed settlement proceeds
without paying the HLA lien, remained liable for the entire amount of
lien or only for the limited (50%) portion it should have paid to the
hospital. 6 The court began by defining the word "lien"6 and identified
HLA liens as "statutory nonpossessory liens." Statutory nonpossessory
liens are generally nonconsensual liens and are typically enacted "to
compensate a person who [has], pursuant to express or implied contract,
furnishe[d] services." ' The court interpreted the "amount of [its] lien
claimed in the notice which the hospital was entitled to receive,"
specified in section 3045.4, to be written in the past tense.70 Accordingly,
the court held that the language referred back to the amount that the
hospital was entitled to receive at the time of judgment dispersion, and
so limited the hospital's recovery to the lesser of: (i) 50 percent of the
judgment, or (2) the amount stated in the lien notice.7 Therefore, a HLA
lien holder may recover a maximum of 50 percent of any judgment
amount paid by a third-party tortfeasor under section 3045.4.72
I. Application of the Nishihama Decision
Under the Nishihama court's reasoning, the Parnell Scenario
described in the introduction would be resolved in a manner more
favorable to Joel Parnell. San Joaquin Community Hospital's HLA lien
would be limited to a maximum of $ioo,ooo (the discounted rate actually
paid by the health insurance carrier), instead of the $13O,OOO demanded
in the lien notice (the difference between the discounted and customary
rates). However, the 50 percent HLA limitation of section 3045.4 would
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Brourman v. Tenet Healthsystem Hosps., Inc., No. B152586, 2002 WL 31517947, at
*6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2002); see also Whiteside v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58o,
584 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
66. 932 P.2d 212-13 (Cal. 1997).
67. Supra note 23.
68. Mercy Hosp., 932 P.2d at 211.
69. WrrKIN, supranote 23, at § 68.
70. Mercy Hosp., 932 P.2d at 213-14 (quoting CAL. Civ. CODE § 168 (West 1993)).
71. Id.
72.

Id.
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still apply. Under the Mercy Hospital court's interpretation of section
3045.4, San Joaquin may recover the lesser of 50 percent of the judgment
or the amount stated in the lien notice.73 Because 50 percent of the
hypothetical recovered judgment ($125,000) is less than the amount
stated in the lien notice ($130,000), San Joaquin's maximum recovery
initially appears to be $I25,ooo. However, a medical care provider cannot
recover more than contractually negotiated discounted rates under the
Nishihama court's interpretation of the HLA. Therefore, under the
Nishihama decision, San Joaquin's HLA lien recovery is limited to the
discounted rates it has with Parnell's insurance carrier, or $ioo,ooo. The
following table illustrates the resolution of the Parnell Scenario under
the Nishihama court's reasoning:
NishihamaDecision
50% of Judgment

$125,000

Amount Stated in HLA Lien Notice

$130,000

Lesser of 50% of Judgment or
Amount Stated in HLA Lien Notice

$125,000

Maximum Recovery Allowed by Case
Amount Recoverable

$100,000

(limited by discounted rates)
$IOO,OOO

Application of the Swanson Court Decision
Pursuant to the Swanson court's interpretation of the HLA, the
Parnell Scenario described in the introduction is resolved very differently
and is more favorable to the medical care provider. San Joaquin
Community Hospital may now attempt to recover a portion of the
difference between its negotiated discounted rates with Parnell's
insurance carrier and its customary rates despite any accusations of
balance billing by Parnell. Section 3045.4's 50 percent limitation on the
HLA lien amount still applies, but pursuant to the Swanson decision, San
Joaquin may recover up to the amount of its customary charges or a
maximum of $230,000. Again, pursuant to the Mercy Hospital court's
interpretation of section 3045.4, San Joaquin may recover the lesser of 50
percent of the recovered judgment or the amount stated in the lien
notice. " Because 50 percent of the judgment ($125,000) is less than the
amount stated in the lien notice ($130,000), San Joaquin's maximum
recovery again appears to be $I25,ooo. However, a medical care provider
may recover by HLA lien an amount up to its customary charges and is
not limited by its discounted rates under the Swanson court's
interpretation of the HLA. Accordingly, San Joaquin may recover (and
2.

73. Mercy Hosp., 932 P.2d at 213.
74. Id.; CAL. CIv. CODE § 3045.4 (West 1993).
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Parnell must pay) $125,000, or $25,000 more under the Swanson decision
than the amount calculated pursuant to the Nishihama decision. Another
table illustrates the resolution of the Parnell Scenario under the Swanson
court's reasoning:
Swanson Decision
50% of Judgment

$125,000

Amount Stated in HLA Lien Notice

$130,000

Lesser of 50% of Judgment or
Amount Stated in HLA Lien Notice

$25,000

Maximum Recovery Allowed by Case
Amount Recoverable

$I5O,OOO
(limited by customary rates)
$125,000

III. PROPOSAL
A.

CALIFORNIA COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW THE NSHIHAMA DECISION

The broadly defined purpose of the HLA is to ensure hospital
payment from patients injured by third-party tortfeasors, while making
certain that the patients retain sufficient resources to cover their other
costs.75 The Nishihama court's interpretation of the HLA76 best serves the
legislature's purpose while providing adequate assurance that hospitals
will recover at least a part of their costs. Although the Swanson court's
interpretation of the HLA authorizes balance billing based on a
hospital's customary rates,77 numerous arguments indicate that the
Nishihama court's interpretation of the HLA is a more reasoned and
equitable solution. That court's interpretation of the HLA is a better one
because: (I) the interpretation recognizes the parties' freedom to
contract; (2) medical care providers seeking to recover the difference
between their discounted and customary rates have no independent
cause of action against the patient; (3) the legislative history of the HLA
does not contemplate or mention balance billing; (4) public policy
dictates against the Swanson court's interpretation; and (5) cases
interpreting similar statutes similar to the HLA have comported with the
Nishihama court's interpretation.
I.

ContractualFreedom

The Nishihama court's interpretation of the HLA favors the
freedom of parties to contract for the costs of medical care. The court
75. Mercy Hosp., 932 P.2d at 212.
76. The Fifth Appellate District came to the same conclusion in Parnell v. Adventist Health
System/West, which was depublished after the California Supreme Court grated certiorari. 131 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 148, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted, 69 P.3d 978 (Cal. 2003).
77. Swanson, 1i8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329-30.
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stated "[t]he amount that a hospital is entitled to receive as payment
necessarily turns on any agreement it has with the... injured person's
insurer."' Both state and federal courts have traditionally favored
parties' contractual freedom." Health insurance carriers and other
insurers have specifically negotiated their rates so that medical care
providers will accept them as payment in full for their services. Allowing
a medical care provider to base its lien recovery on amorphous
customary charges, rather than specifically negotiated discount rates,
effectively provides an "end round" of the contract between the parties.
This result undermines party expectations of contractual enforceability.
Balance billing allows a hospital to recover more than what it has
specifically bargained for with a health insurance carrier. It also forces a
patient to absorb the additional costs of medical care when he or she has
obtained health insurance for the very purpose of avoiding high medical
care costs. In the Nishihama decision, for example, California Pacific
Medical Center ("CPMC") agreed with the patient's health insurance
carrier to provide necessary health services for $3,6oo and would accept
that amount as payment in full." CPMC subsequently demanded its
customary rates of $17,J68 from the patient with a HLA lien." The court
held that HLA lien rights do not extend beyond the contracted amount a
hospital agrees to receive from a health insurance carrier as payment in
full for health care services.8' Implied in its holding is the court's
recognition of: (i) both parties' freedom to contract, and (2) the concept
that specifically negotiated rates should be binding on the parties who
have bargained and/or relied on them. 3 Consequently, the courts' great
respect for the freedom to contract"' dictates that California courts follow
the Nishihama decision.
2.
No Independent Cause of Action Against Patients
In addition to contractual concerns, the Nishihama court recognized
that a medical care provider seeking to recover the difference between its
discounted and customary rates under the HLA has no independent
cause of action against its patients."' The court cited Graubergerv. St.

78.
79.
8o.
81.

Nishihama v. City & County of San Francisco, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
See, e.g., Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447,456 (9O5).
Nishihama, i12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866.
Id. at 866-67.
82. Id. at 867.
83. See id. at 867-68.
84. Smiley, 196 U.S. at 456.
85. Nishihama, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868. While the legislative history to California Civil Code
section 3040 indicates that the HLA gives an independent right to assert a lien, the lien right is not
against the patient. Analysis of S.B. 1471: Health Care Liens, S. Judiciary Comm., i999-2ooo Reg. Sess.
4-5 (Cal. 2000) (as amended April 27, 2000), availableat http:/Ileginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/99-oo/billsen
sb- 451-15oo/sb-i47i cfa 200005o3_o840io_sen_comm.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
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Francis Hospital6 as persuasive authority for a medical care provider's
lack of an independent cause of action against its patients. In
Grauberger,the defendant hospital contended that the HLA conferred
an independent right to recover payment from the third-party
tortfeasor' The district court for the Northern District of California did
not agree. First, the court reasoned that "the language of the HLA does
not give hospitals a cause of action; it only allows hospitals to place a lien
on the patient's cause of action."8 Second, the Grauberger court
determined that the phrase "reasonable and necessary charges ' in the
HLA did not give the hospital a cause of action against the patient. 9°
Rather, the court determined that "reasonable and necessary charges"
are charges made to the patient, and in the absence of a right to be paid
for the charges, a hospital has no "amount" to seek from judgment
proceeds against a third-party tortfeasor. 9'
The California Supreme Court has also recognized that a hospital's
right to payment is derivative of the patients, albeit in a different
context. 9' In Mercy Hospital, the California Supreme Court held a
hospital's lien rights against a tortfeasor's insurer to be dependent on the
amount the patient was entitled to recover from that insurer.93 Thus, the
hospital's statutory lien rights were not independent, but were instead
derivative of, and dependent on, the rights of the patient.'
Without an independent cause of action against the patient, it is
difficult to reason that a medical care provider may recover beyond its
contractual discounted rates. Standing alone, a medical care provider
would only have a cause of action against the health insurance carrier,
and in that situation would be limited to a breach of contract cause of
action for failure to pay the discounted rates. Allowing a medical care
provider to recover damages beyond a breach of.contract claim would
create another "end round" of the contractual discounted rates and a
windfall for the medical care provider at the expense of its patients.
3. Legislative History and Intent
The legislative history of the original HLA lacks any mention of
balance billing concerns. There is also no indication that the legislature
even considered that HLA liens could be used to recover the difference
between insurance payments for medical services and a medical care
86. 149 F. Supp. 2d iI86 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
87. Id. at i188.
88. Id. at i9i.
89. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3045.1 (i961).
9o. Grauberger,149 F. Supp. 2d at i191.
I
9 . Id.
92. Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 932 P.2d 210, 211 (Cal. 1997).
93. Id,
94. Id.
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provider's "usual and customary charges."95 The likely culprit for this
lack of legislative history is the dramatic change in the medical insurance
industry since the enactment of the original HLA. In i96I, the negligible
gap between discounted rates and customary rates did not concern
medical care providers or the legislature. 9 As a result, it is likely that the
legislature did not contemplate the HLA's impact in the context of
balance billing. The purpose of the original HLA as stated in the
available legislative history was "to secure part of the patient's recovery
from liable third persons to pay his or her hospital bill, while ensuring
that the patient retained sufficient funds to address other losses resulting
from tortious injury."' Based on this statutory purpose, it is unlikely that
the legislature intended to rewrite California's law of accord and
satisfaction 9 to permit a balance billing scheme via the HLA.9
Whether a medical care provider contracts for discounted rates or
simply accepts discounted rates from a health insurance carrier, it is the
medical care provider's prerogative to accept or refuse the rates offered
by the insurer." In either situation, there is nothing in the statute or its
legislative history relieving a medical care provider of its choice to
provide services at a price other than its customary rates." ' Thus, the
silence of the legislative history and the purpose of the HLA indicate
that the Nishihama court's interpretation of the statute best applies the
intent of the California legislature.
4. Public Policy
Requiring an uninsured patient who has received medical care to
pay up to half of his or her recovery' to the medical care provider seems
fair and equitable. Such a patient has benefited at the expense of the
medical care provider. However, a patient who has specifically purchased
health insurance to pay for medical expenses at some point in the future
is distinguishable from an uninsured patient who receives medical care.
In the latter situation, the matters of fairness and equity become murky.
Such a patient has likely purchased medical insurance for the sole reason
of limiting exposure to medical costs to the deductibles or co-payments
required by his or her insurance policy." Forcing a fully insured patient
to pay additional amounts to cover customary charges, despite having

95. See Parnell v. Adventist Health Sys./W., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148, 152-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003),
cert. granted, 69 P.3d 978 (Cal. 2003).

96. Cf. Calder, supra note 26 at 367-68.
97. Supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the original purpose of the HLA).
98. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1521-1523 (West 1982).
99. Parnell,131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at i58.
IOO. Id.
tot. Id.
502. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3045.4 (West 1993) (limiting the amount of HLA lien liability).

103. See Parnell,131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
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adequate health insurance purchased specifically for this purpose, is
unfair and inequitable.
In the circumstances described above, a windfall may be created for
at least one of the parties."' If an insured patient's medical insurance is
sufficient to pay the discounted rates, the insured patient who recovers
from a tortfeasor any additional amounts for medical costs in a lawsuit
may be perceived as receiving a windfall."° This patient made insurance
payments to cover discounted rates, but has recovered more despite
having received in effect pre-paid medical care."' However, a medical
care provider receiving both its contractual discounted rates as well as its
customary charges from a patient's judgment recovery has similarly
received a windfall. The medical care provider has in effect received
more than the amount for which it specifically contracted with the health
insurance carrier.
It is the medical care provider who is often better able to absorb
financial "loss" as a result of the medical care services provided." In
other words, a medical care provider can better bear the loss of medical
care services under the cost/benefit economic model. Modern hospitals
are often part of a larger corporate or non-corporate conglomerate of
hospitals and medical care providers."' Medical care providers are likely
to have a much larger pool of resources than an individual patient and
are able to absorb high medical care costs. While the medical care
provider is essentially innocent,"'° the patient has already suffered
through his or her injuries and the resulting lawsuit against the thirdparty tortfeasor. Such a patient should not also be forced bear additional
medical costs. Taking the cost/benefit economic model, together with the
purpose of the HLA," ° the balance billing costs of medical care should be
borne by medical care providers instead of patients.
5. Similar FederalStatutes Disallow Recovery of Customary
Charges
Other statutes similar to the HLA do not allow medical care
providers to collect their full and customary charges and limit providers
to agreed-upon discounted rates. For instance, federal Medicaid law does
not allow Medicaid providers to recover their full and customary charges

Io4. See, e.g., Hanif v. Hous. Auth., 246 Cal. Rptr. 192, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (considering
whether an injured plaintiff may recover more than the amount paid for medical care).
io5. Parnell,13i Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153.
io6. The issue of whether jury awards are actually delineated into separate categories such as
medical costs, pain and suffering, etc. is beyond the scope of this Note.
io7. Such as receiving the lower discounted rates as opposed to customary rates.
io8. See, e.g., Nishihama v. City & County of San Francisco, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 866 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) (stating that California Pacific Medical Center is an affiliate of Sutter Health).
1o9. See Olszewski v. Scripps Health, 69 P.3 d 927, 942-43 (Cal. 2003).
iio. See supra notes 35-36.
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via statutory lien."' In Olszewski v. Scripps Health, the California
Supreme Court recognized that the California Medical Assistance
Program ("Medi-Cal")" allows a medical care provider to recover its full
customary rates for services by lien."3 A medical care provider, after
refunding a Medi-Cal payment, may recover its customary rates from a
Medi-Cal beneficiary's recovery from a responsible third-party tortfeasor
under state law."4 However, the Olszewski court held that federal law
preempted the Medi-Cal lien statutes at issue."5 Medicaid statutes and
regulations are "unambiguous and limit provider collections from a
Medicaid beneficiary to, at most, the cost-sharing charges allowed under
the state plan, even when a third-party tortfeasor
is later found liable for
' 6
the injuries suffered by that beneficiary." "
By finding that federal Medicaid law preempted the Medi-Cal liens
at issue in Olszewski, the California Supreme Court implicitly agreed
with Congress that a medical care provider should not be able to recover
any portion of the difference between its discounted and customary
rates. Consequently, because federal law similar to the HLA allows
medical care providers to recover only their discounted rates by statutory
lien, California courts should follow the Nishihama court's interpretation
of the HLA.
B.

CRITIQUE OF THE SWANSON DECISION

The Swanson court's interpretation of the HLA is problematic and
should not be followed by other California courts because: (I) the court
improperly interpreted and misapplied the Mercy Hospital decision; (2)
the court makes an improper interpretation of "reasonable and necessary
charges" as described by the HLA; and (3)its reliance on the legislative
history of California Civil Code section 3040 (governing balance billing
in the context of contract liens of HMOs"7 ) is misplaced.
i. The Swanson Case Improperly Interpretedand Misapplied the
Mercy Hospital Holding
The Swanson court relied on two central premises to determine that
a medical care provider may recover a portion of the difference between
iii. Olszewski, 69 P.3d at 941-42.
112. Medi-Cal is the California equivalent of the federal Medicaid program.
113. Id.at 942.

114. Id. The Olszewski court noted that California's Medi-Cal law allows a medical care provider
to recover a greater amount by lien than otherwise allowed under the state plan. Id.
i15. Id. at 946.

116. Id. at 942. The Olszewski court also stated in dicta that by invalidating Medi-Cal law by
preemption, it gave the third-party tortfeasor a windfall at the expense of the "innocent medical care
provider." Id. at 947. The court urged the California legislature to remedy the situation in a manner
consistent with federal law. Id.
II7. Parnell v. Adventist Health Sys./W., i3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148, 155-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2oo3), cert.

granted, 69 P.3d 978 (Cal. 2003).
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its discounted and customary rates by HLA lien."8 The court cited the
Mercy Hospital decision for both assertions." 9 The Swanson court's
reliance on the Mercy Hospital decision is misplaced. First, the Swanson
court determined the HLA to be a statutory lien creating an independent
lien right on behalf of the medical care provider that does not require the
patient to be a debtor of the medical care provider.'
For this
proposition, the Swanson court likely relied on the following language
from Mercy Hospital: "Whatever principles might generally apply to
liens, former section 3045.4 is a statutory, not a common law, lien. The
legislature is, of course, free to define and limit such a lien, and has done
so in this case ....' Contrary to the court's suggestion, this passage did not
refer to a "legislative expansion" of common law liens by making
hospital liens independent from any underlying patient debt.'2 Rather,
when read in context, the limitation cited by the California Supreme
Court in Mercy Hospital referred to the 50 percent limitation on HLA
liens of section 3045.4. 23' Therefore, the Swanson court's contention that

the Mercy Hospital holding creates an independent right against patients
is unsupported by the text of the statute.
The second premise from Mercy Hospital relied upon by the4
Swanson court is that HLA liens are not charges against the patient.'
Instead, the Swanson court concluded, the HLA conveys a lien right in
favor of the medical care provider against third-party tortfeasors.'5 As
authority for this proposition, the Swanson court again quoted the Mercy
Hospital court, stating that a hospital lien is a "'statutory medical lien in
favor of a hospital against third persons liable for the patient's
injuries....2 6 However, the Swanson opinion failed to include the passage
immediately preceding the quote from the Mercy Hospital case, which
states:
Here, of course, we address the parameters of a [HLA] lien that
compensates a [medical care provider] for providing medical services

to an injured person by giving the [medical care provider] a direct right
to a certain percentage of specific property, i.e., a judgment,
"
compromise, or settlement, otherwise accruingto that person.27
The Swanson court misconstrued the passage by reading it out of
context. Read in context, the two passages from the Mercy Hospital
118.

Swanson v. St. John's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 328-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
II9. Id.
120. Id. at 328.
121. Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 932 P.2d 210, 215 (Cal. I997).
122. Parnell, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
123.

Id.

124.

Swanson, 1i8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329.

125.

Id.

126. Id. (quoting Mercy Hosp., 932 P.2d at 211).
127. Mercy Hosp., 932 P.2d at 211 (emphasis added).
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decision recognize that HLA liens attached to property "otherwise"
belonging to the patient. Despite the lien attaching to the property while
it is controlled by the third-party tortfeasor or insurer, the lien only
attaches because of the patient's underlying property right2 8 Without
such a right to judgment, there would be no property on which the HLA
lien could attach.'29 Thus, the Mercy Hospital decision held that the lien
acts as a charge against a patient's property interest and is actually a
charge by the medical care provider against the patient. The Swanson
court misinterpreted Mercy Hospital and therefore misstates and
misconstrues the leading case authority on the HLA to favor balance
billing. Accordingly, the Swanson decision's improper interpretation of
the HLA should not be followed by other California courts.
2.
The Swanson Case's Textual Argument
The Swanson court also based its decision to allow balance billing on
a textual interpretation of the HLA 3 ° The court interpreted the phrase
"reasonable and necessary charges," as described in section 3045.1
(giving the medical care provider the right to place a HLA lien on a
patient's judgment), to be equivalent to a medical care provider's
customary rates.' As a result, the Swanson court concluded that the
language of the HLA authorizes a medical care provider to recover the
difference between its discounted and customary rates from a patient's
tort recovery.'32
The phrase "reasonable and necessary charges" is not defined in the
HLA, nor does the phrase have a specific trade usage meaning in the
health care industry.'33 Instead, the traditional industry terminology for a
medical care provider's customary rates is "usual and customary
charges" or "reasonable and customary charges.' 34 The traditional
formulation for the actual medical services provided by a medical care
provider (i.e., services the provider deems required for the patient's wellbeing) is "medically necessary" or "reasonable and necessary" services. '
At first glance, the phrase "reasonable and customary charges" is
similar to the HLA's "reasonable and necessary charges" language. In
legal terminology, however, the phrases stand for very different
propositions. In Parnell,the court scrutinized the phrase "reasonable and
necessary charges" in relation to a medical care provider's customary

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
Parnell, i31
See id.
Swanson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 328-30.
See id. at 329.
Id. at 329-30.
Parnell,131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
See, e.g., Van Ness v. Blue Cross of Cal., io4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5 11, 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
See, e.g., County of San Diego v. State, 931 P.2d 312, 335 (Cal. 1997).
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rates., 6 Parnell involved an insured patient who was injured as a
passenger in a taxicab."' The patient received hospital care from the
defendant medical care provider, and the defendant charged the patient's
health insurance carrier its contractual discounted rates.13 The Parnell
court proposed that charges which are "usual and customary" may be
equivalent to "reasonable" charges.'39 However, the Parnell court
warned, "one might wonder about the use of 'necessary' to further
describe the 'reasonable' charges."'" ° In other words, under a plainlanguage reading of the HLA, balance billing for the difference between
discounted and customary rates is not "necessary" in any ordinary sense
of the word. 4' Customary rates are not "necessary" for a patient to
obtain services from the medical care provider, since the patient has an
existing contractual right to such services through the health insurance
carrier.42 Further, this contractual right typically requires the medical
care supplier to provide its services at the negotiated discount rates as
payment in full for the services. 43 Neither is balance billing "necessary"
for a medical care provider to recover its costs of providing medical care
services. The medical care provider has specifically negotiated discount
rates with the health insurance carrier, presumably in contemplation of44
the actual costs involved in providing those services to a patient.'
Therefore, reasonable and necessary charges as used in by the California
legislature in the HLA are not equivalent to a medical care provider's
customary rates according to the Parnelldecision.
The Parnell court's interpretation of this statutory phrase is sound.
"Reasonable and necessary charges" is not synonymous with a medical
care provider's customary rates. If the legislature had intended for the
HLA to allow the recovery of a medical care provider's customary rates
it would have used the traditional health care industry formulation of
"usual and customary charges." It is plausible to assume that the
legislature would have used an industry specific term if it meant to
describe a medical care provider's customary rates. While "usual and
customary" could potentially be equated with "reasonable" charges, use
of the word "necessary" indicates a different motive by the legislature.
"Necessary charges" instead refers to the charges a medical care provider
decides are required for a patient's well-being. Balance billing charges
136. 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57.
137. Id. at I5o.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 157.
140. Id.
141. "Necessary" is defined as something "that cannot be done without... [or is] absolutely
required." WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 151O-II (3d ed. 1993).

142. Parnell,131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157.
143. Id.
i44. A "reasonable hospital" would not contract for rates lower than its actual costs.
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are not "necessary" in any ordinary use of the word, in the context of a
patient's receipt of medical service or a medical care provider's attempt
to recover its costs. Accordingly, California courts should use the Parnell
court's determination of the phrase "reasonable and necessary charges"
as not equivalent to a medical care provider's customary rates and
disallow balance billing.
3. The Legislative History of California Civil Code Section 3040
The plaintiff in Swanson argued that HLA liens are invalid
whenever the lien amount exceeds the discounted rates paid by a
patient's medical insurer.'45 The Swanson court dismissed this argument,
citing the legislative history of California Civil Code section 3040.46
Section 3040 imposes a limit on an HMO's ability to recover the
difference between its discounted and customary rates when the HMO
pays a negotiated discount rate for patient treatment. 47 The court took
section 3040's legislative history as evidence that the California state
legislature specifically exempted HLA liens from balance billing limits
and by implication allowed a medical care provider to recover the
difference between its customary and discounted rates.'8 The Judicial
Committee analysis of section 3040 states that "[section 3040] does not
intend to limit [medical care provider] liens now available under
California Civil Code section 3045. 1."14
Rather than a license to recover additional charges by HLA lien, the
statement quoted above is instead equivalent to obiter dictum' ° in a
judicial opinion. The statement is bare; the committee cited no authority
for its claim nor did it elaborate as to the effects it would have on the
HLA. It is also irrelevant to the discussion of the actual purpose of the
bill before the committee-that of section 3040 and its application to
HMOs. The Judicial Committee analysis statement is therefore not
precendential and the Swanson court's reliance on it as a basis for
145. Swanson v. St. John's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
146. Id. at 329-30.
147. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3040 (West 1993).
148. Swanson, i18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329-30.
149. Analysis of S.B. 1471: Health Care Liens, S. Judiciary Comm., 1999-2ooo Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal.
2000) (as amended April 27, 2000), availableat http://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/99-oo/bill/sen/sb-1451comm.html (last visited Nov. 1o, 2004). The Swanson court
15 oo/sb-1 47 1_cfa-2000o 5 o 3 o8 0io_sen
4

again neglected to read the cited authority in context. Immediately following the quoted passage, the
Senate Judiciary Committee's analysis states: "Although in California hospitals have an independent
right to assert a lien under California Civil Code section 3045.1, this case merely illustrates how the
area of health care liens is evolving, as... consumers become aware of and challenge billing practices
of health care service plans." Id.
150. Obiter dictum is defined as "[a] judicial comment made during the course of delivering a
judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not
precedential." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999); see also Parnell v. Adventist Health
Sys./W., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148, 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted, 69 P.3d 978 (Cal. 2003); Stockton

Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, 304 P.2d 7,9 (Cal. 1956).
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allowing balance billing under the HLA is unfounded and
unpersuasive. 5'
In addition, the legislative history to section 3040 does not mention
balance billing, its equivalent, or even acknowledge the practice. The
only legislative limit imposed upon HLA liens is the 50 percent
constraint of section 3045.4.' The most likely interpretation of the
Committee's statement is that section 3o4o's balance billing limits do not
affect the different constraints of section 3045.4. The 50 percent cap on
HLA lien recovery follows the purpose of the HLA, seeking to ensure
that a patient retains sufficient funds to address other losses resulting
from his or her injuries. The legislative history cited by the Swanson
court then is almost certainly an attempt to ensure that courts do not
misconstrue section 3040's balance billing limits to disturb section
3045.4's HLA lien limitation. The analyst's statement in the legislative
history of section 3040 does not accurately reflect California law with
regards to balance billing under the HLA,'53 and the approach described
in the Nishihama decision should govern subsequent California cases.
CONCLUSION

The current split in the California Courts of Appeal regarding
balance billing practice in the context of the HLA has had a negative
effect on both patients and medical care providers. Rising health care
costs, along with a proliferation of new health care legislation, has caused
confusion for judges, juries, and attorneys attempting to apply the HLA.
The confusion has resulted in unnecessary litigation expenses as well as
in opposing results between the California appellate districts. As the
United States population continues to age and health care use becomes
even more prevalent, either the California state legislature or the
California Supreme Court must address the confusion and provide a
well-reasoned and final answer to the current appellate court split.
The California Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve
this split when it hears Parnellv. Adventist Health Systems/West during its
2004-2005 term. 54 Should the California Supreme Court consider the
issue, it should follow the Nishihama court's interpretation of the HLA
and disallow balance billing. The penchant of United States courts for
contractual freedom mandates that medical care providers' negotiated
rates limit a medical care provider's recovery by lien to those rates.
Similarly, the legislative intent and history to the HLA favors an
interpretation disallowing balance billing. Public policy in favor of
151. See Parnell, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.

Id. at 157.
153. Id. at 156.
154. 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148. The parties have concluded oral arguments but no date has been
given for the California Supreme Court's opinion.
152.
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protecting innocent patients also mandates that courts bestow any
windfalls on the injured party, rather than on medical care providers or
third-party tortfeasors. Finally, similar statutes such as federal Medicaid
law do not allow for balance billing by lien and provide an equitable
example for the California courts to follow in the HLA context.
During the immediate future, and until legislative or California
Supreme Court intervention, California appellate courts must consider
the effects of balance billing on each party involved in a dispute. A
careful analysis of the Swanson opinion reveals both inequitable
reasoning and results with regards to the patient. As such, California
courts should follow the Nishihama court's interpretation of the HLA
and disallow balance billing by HLA lien. The Nishihama court's
interpretation is more consistent with the text and purpose of the HLA
and yields the more just and equitable result to all parties involved.
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